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Introduction
John Davis, Alain Marciano and Jochen Runde
The closing decades of the twentieth century saw a dramatic increase in 
interest in the role of philosophical ideas in economics. The period also saw a 
significant expansion in scholarly investigation into the different connections 
between economics and philosophy, as seen in the emergence of new journals, 
professional associations, conferences, seminar series, websites, research 
networks, teaching methods, and interdisciplinary collaboration. One of the 
results of this set of developments has been a remarkable distillation in thinking 
about philosophy and economics around a number of key subjects and themes. 
The goal of this Companion to Economics and Philosophy is to exhibit and 
explore a number of these areas of convergence. The volume is accordingly 
divided into three parts, each of which highlights a leading area of scholarly 
concern. They are: political economy conceived as political philosophy, the 
methodology and epistemology of economics, and social ontology and the 
ontology of economics. The authors of the chapters in the volume were chosen 
on the basis of their having made distinctive and innovative contributions to 
their respective areas of expertise. In addition, authors were asked to not only 
survey the state of the field as they saw it, but also provide statements of their 
own positions and their perspectives on the field in question and its possible 
direction of development in the future. We thus hope this volume will serve not 
only as an introduction to the field, but also stimulate further work and thinking 
concerning the questions it investigates.
Political economy conceived as political philosophy
The essays in the first part of this Companion investigate the idea of economics 
or political economy as political philosophy. This last term should not to be 
understood in the pejoratively restrictive sense of Rosenberg’s (1992) definition 
of economics as mathematical political science. Rather, it should be taken to 
refer to the use of specific (namely economic) tools to understand the conditions 
of social order. This perspective harks back to the founders of economics and 
their conception of the discipline. Of course some would argue that more than 
two hundred years of scientific research have carried the discipline away from 
this conception. In fact, however, and as the issues discussed in the chapters 
in this section show, the distance that separates political economy in its recent 
developments from its origins is not that large.
xii
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Regarding political economy as a form of political philosophy is not to 
deny its existence as a self-standing scientific discipline. Political economy 
is indeed a separate science in its own right and, in the opening chapter on 
‘Natural Law, Natural History and the Foundations of Political Economy’, 
José Luìs Cardoso shows how it came to be so. Cardoso’s argument proceeds 
in two stages that correspond to two distinct but complementary developments 
in the eighteenth century. The first of these was the identification of an object 
interesting and important enough to require analysis over and above that already 
provided within the framework of the philosophy of natural law. Social and 
economic organisation thus came to be viewed as parts of the natural order. The 
second development was a recognition of the need for some form of scientific 
method in terms of which the analysis would be conducted. Here, according 
to Cardoso, political economy was deeply influenced by the growing stature 
of sciences that aimed to uncover the laws that governed the functioning of 
the natural world. Natural history, the most authoritative field of knowledge in 
the eighteenth century, along with the conceptual constructions of the natural 
sciences, accordingly came to provide the tools with which political economy 
was able to establish itself as a science.
The three chapters that follow, by Alain Marciano, Shaun Hargreaves Heap and 
Bruno Frey and Mathias Benz respectively, discuss the virtues and limitations 
of the mainstream (neoclassical) economic model of the human agent, and the 
potential fruitfulness of a more refined representation. The objective is not, as 
Hargeaves Heap makes clear, to suggest that people never act in accordance 
with the assumptions of mainstream rational choice theory. Rather, it is to 
show that the highly stripped down psychology of the standard model of the 
economic agent is too thin to give an adequate account of people’s actions in 
all possible walks of life. As Frey and Benz explain, this model is a relatively 
recent consequence of economists’ efforts to rid the discipline of all traces of 
psychology, a contention well supported by Marciano’s demonstration that 
the conception of economic man adopted by the founding fathers of political 
economy was indeed considerably richer than it is now. As Marciano describes 
it, the rejection of Cartesian rationalism in favour of empiricism by Scottish 
Enlightenment authors such as Hume and Smith, led naturally to a theory of 
man limited in his cognitive abilities, whose knowledge would always be highly 
subjective and situation-dependent.
The central message in Hargreaves Heap’s chapter on ‘Economic rationality’ 
is the need to pay attention to intersubjectively shared beliefs, particularly 
when attempting to understand behaviour that seems resistant to the standard 
model of economic agency. In many situations, according to Hargreaves Heap, 
individual agents are not driven solely by instrumental reason and the direct 
satisfaction they might derive from the outcome of any action, but also by the 
sense of self-respect they achieve from knowing that their actions reflect well 
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upon them. The difficulty this raises is that even if the desire for self-respect 
is regarded as a kind of preference, self-respect does not fit into the analytical 
framework of the standard rational choice model. This is because people’s 
judgements regarding what actions reflect well on them cannot be decided in 
isolation, namely without reference to the beliefs and values of other members 
of the community. And if so, it then it becomes necessary to analyse how 
individuals acquire and share beliefs about what is worthy. Obviously, these 
questions go beyond the boundaries of the rational choice model, and require 
input from other disciplines. Hargreaves Heap points out that psychology offers 
some relevant insights here, especially about cognitive dissonance and intrinsic/
extrinsic motivation.
Frey and Benz, in their essay ‘From Imperialism to Inspiration: A Survey of 
Economics and Psychology’, also argue that economists can no longer rely only 
on an approach to human behaviour based on the model of the ‘homunculus 
economicus’. They too observe that there are many forms of human behaviour 
that are in conflict with the assumptions of, and therefore incomprehensible 
within, the framework of the standard model. In particular, Frey and Benz point 
out that, in contrast to the standard model, people face cognitive limits and are 
emotionally constrained, are not systematically egoistic in their behaviour, and 
are not committed to acting under the constraints of the material elements of 
their material utility function. The suggested remedy is that economists might 
draw on psychology to ‘inspire’ them out of the current impasse. But again, 
Frey and Benz are not proposing that economics be replaced by psychology. 
They continue to regard the standard model of the rational economic agent as a 
consistent general framework against which the insights of psychology, which 
‘consists of a large number of partial theories and special effects, which are 
more or less isolated from each other’, may be thrown into sharper relief.
A more refined, ‘inspired’ conception of economic man necessarily leads 
to normative implications in relation to the nature, the scope and the role of 
institutions. For example, in his essay entitled ‘The historical and philosophical 
foundations of new political economy’, Marciano shows that sympathy is a 
necessary condition for successful co-ordination, although not sufficient to 
order large and open societies. Therefore, even if spontaneously emerging 
conventions play an important role in allowing successful coordination, there 
is also a place for consciously designed institutions in overcoming the natural 
limits of sympathy. Hargreaves Heap, for his part, stresses the necessity of 
deriving prescriptive consequences from the expressive conception of rationality 
he proposes. In particular, from his perspective, it is important to take seriously 
the role institutions play in shaping, and contributing to the sharing of beliefs. 
Societies need institutions that allow people to participate in the discussion of 
shared beliefs, and which give them scope to express those beliefs in action, in 
Hargreaves Heap’s view, much in the way suggested by Habermas.
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Geoffrey Hodgson’s chapter, ‘Institutional Economics: From Menger and 
Veblen to Coase and North’, surveys the commonalities and differences between 
the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ institutionalist schools, as well as some differences 
between individual members of each camp. Like many of his co-contributors, 
Hodgson is interested in competing theoretical conceptions of the economic actor. 
On this front, in his view, the new institutionalism represents a step backwards 
in that its commitment to the standard model of rational agency has obscured 
various key insights of the older institutionalists. But Hodgson’s main concern 
is with the related idea that individual action and institutions bear on each other 
in a reciprocal way, i.e., that while individual action presupposes institutions 
(or rules), institutions are at the same time affected, indeed reproduced, by 
the total of individual action. Hodgson argues that this mutual dependence is 
recognised in the writings of the old institutionalist school, which is therefore not 
restricted to the doctrine that all human behaviour is socially or institutionally 
determined. For example, he demonstrates that both Veblen and Commons see 
the interactions between individuals and institutions as a top-down and a bottom-
up process of reciprocal influences. But Hodgson recognises that the different 
ways in which institutions affect peoples’ behaviour remain underdeveloped in 
the old institutional economics, and suggests that this issue therefore provides 
fertile ground for further work.
As Hodgson notes, one way to proceed here is to adopt an evolutionary 
approach to the study of institutions. Veblen’s attempt to harness some of 
Darwin’s ideas as a basis for an evolutionary economic science provides 
an early example here, and there is of course something of a tradition in 
economics of authors advocating evolutionary approaches of various kinds. 
Jack Vromen’s chapter, ‘Taking evolution seriously: what difference does it 
make for economics?’ is essentially a survey of this tradition, and provides the 
valuable service of providing a coherent overview of what is by any measure a 
pretty disparate literature. Vromen’s organising principle is the extent to which 
the introduction of evolutionary thinking is seen to affect standard methods, and 
he provides a revealing grouping of various commentators under the following 
three headings: the ‘revolutionaries’, like Veblen, who believe that taking 
evolution seriously requires profound changes to standard economic theory; 
the ‘conservatives’, like Alchian, Friedman and Becker, who believe it possible 
to accommodate evolutionary economic processes within standard economic 
theory; and ‘revisionists’ like Robert Frank, who claim that evolutionary themes 
can be accommodated by revising or amending parts of standard economic 
theory while leaving its essential elements unchanged.
We have noted Hargreaves Heap’s emphasis on specifi cally rational, private 
deliberation in the process of individual preference formation, but other writers 
have focused instead on public deliberation. Indeed economists, political 
scientists, and political philosophers, who have devoted their attention to the role 
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that deliberation could or should play in our societies, have in some instances 
even gone so far as to propose public deliberation as a means of producing 
a defi nition of social justice. However, while it may be convenient to allow 
normative economics and political philosophy to be guided by the standards 
of public deliberation, this falls well short of what is required for a serious 
investigation of the foundations of ethical principles. Indeed, as Marc Fleurbaey 
notes in his essay ‘Normative economics and theories of distributive justice’, 
too often ordinary thinking about moral principles is guided by pragmatic 
considerations and unexamined moral intuitions, when what is needed is that 
precise criteria be developed and analysed to produce theories that are complex 
enough to address the normative problems society encounters. As a step towards 
this end, Fleurbaey provides a careful survey of the various approaches to 
the problem of defi ning social justice that have been developed by economic 
theorists and philosophers over the last fi fty years. From the Pareto criterion 
and its limits to the theories of fairness and equality of resources, and including 
discussion of libertarian views and social contract theories, Fleurbaey provides 
a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the normative economics literature 
that has assumed increasing importance in economic analysis.
The final chapter in this part of the Companion, Alain Leroux’s ‘Ideology: 
an economic point of view’, returns to the themes explored in Cardoso’s 
opening essay regarding the possibility of separating science from ideology. 
Leroux begins with the standard interpretation of ideology offered by Karl 
Marx. According to Marx, ideology is an inferior form of discourse that offers 
a distorted and coerced representation of the social order – as distinct from 
science, the domain of an objective, non-distorted and unconstrained knowledge. 
Leroux explains how Marx’s approach leads to a vicious circle, namely that it 
is impossible to maintain that any discourse is not spoiled by ideological bias 
while at the same time maintaining the possibility of developing an alternative 
discourse free from any ideology. This logical trap is known as the Mannheim 
Paradox and Joseph A. Schumpeter is one of its most famous victims. In the 
face of the impossibility of eliminating ideology from economic discourse, 
Leroux proposes instead to put ideology, science, and even philosophy on the 
same footing. He does so by presenting them as cognitive strategies or pure 
forms of thought that are interdependent and simultaneously active. From this 
perspective, science, philosophy and ideology allow us to identify the major 
form of thought that characterises a discourse, rather than the objective quality 
of the knowledge that is produced.
The methodology and epistemology of economics
The chapters in the second section of this Companion tackle various issues 
that have been extensively discussed by methodologists and philosophers of 
economics since Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). 
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Indeed the field of economic methodology as a separate field basically dates 
from this period, since practising economists addressed philosophical and 
methodological issues in economics prior to Kuhn’s book but mostly left the 
field to specialists thereafter. One consequence of this development was an 
increasingly sharp division between economists and methodologists regarding 
epistemological matters in economics. While economists remained attached to 
traditional logical positivist methods and the empirical verification of theories, 
economic methodologists almost universally rejected them. At the same time, 
by the 1980s there were a number of quite different, competing approaches 
pursued by economic methodologists. For a brief time, Karl Popper and Imre 
Lakatos’s views held centre stage, but since then economic methodology has 
developed multiple currents. The chapters in Part II are accordingly meant 
to introduce some of the ideas and themes that have preoccupied economic 
methodologists in recent decades.
The first chapter addresses Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research 
programmes (MSRP), which in important respects was a development and 
reformulation of Popper’s thinking, and was the last approach enjoying a degree 
of consensus among methodologists. Roger Backhouse charts the rise and fall 
of the MSRP, explaining its appeal and subsequent doubts. The reason for 
the latter was less second thoughts regarding the fruitfulness of the MSRP 
approach and more a growing interest in a whole variety of new ways of looking 
at methodological questions in economics: rhetoric and discourse analysis, 
sociology of scientific knowledge, the re-discovery of J.S. Mill, etc. In effect, 
methodological thinking was becoming increasingly sophisticated, and this 
introduced new subtleties into debate among methodologists. The MSRP, 
which offered a broad, comprehensive view of the growth and development 
of research programmes began to be perceived as ‘thin’, because it ignored 
many issues that had previously been perceived as peripheral. Backhouse’s own 
discussion reflects this, as he goes beyond the question that long preoccupied 
methodologists in connection with the MSRP – whether it offered an adequate 
account of how economists adopted and abandoned research programmes 
– to examine Lakatos’s own history before his arrival in Britain, and how this 
contributed to the development of his thinking.
Backhouse’s discussion leads naturally to the second chapter in Part II, Wade 
Hands’ ‘Constructivism: the social construction of scientific knowledge’, on 
the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). Whereas the type of question 
methodologists and philosophers had once asked concerned the nature of 
scientific knowledge, social constructivists rather asked how scientists came 
to hold their theories and beliefs. That is, SSK investigated the determination of 
scientists’ beliefs. This focus led to many new ideas (for example, pragmatism, 
hermeneutics, postmodernism, and feminism) that significantly expanded the 
scope of economic methodology substantially beyond its original confines. It 
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also raised difficult philosophical issues, such as what was meant by saying a 
theory was true when social factors could be shown to have led to its adoption. 
Hands surveys the debates within SSK, and then looks at their application to, 
first, economic methodology and, second, the history of economic thought. 
The former involves a reflexive exercise in which methodologists ask how 
their own beliefs are determined. The latter concerns how economists’ beliefs 
are determined. Here we ask need to ask ourselves about social factors that 
influence the adoption of beliefs by economists.
One such factor, until recently much under-appreciated, is gender. Historically 
economists have generally ignored gender in their explanations of markets 
and individual decision-making. How, then, might economics be different 
were this particular factor given attention? Drucilla Barker’s chapter in this 
section, ‘From feminist empiricism to feminist poststructuralism: philosophical 
questions in feminist economics’, surveys the evolution in thinking on the part 
of feminist philosophers, methodologists, and economists since the 1980s, in 
the process distinguishing feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theory, 
feminist poststructuralism, and feminist postmodernism. She explains how this 
development has raised fundamental epistemological and other philosophical 
issues, and how these issues have generated debates over objectivity of science, 
the tension between facts and values, and the relation between science and 
advocacy. Barker emphasises a key perspective on this discussion in her 
emphasis on epistemological communities, the feminist one in particular. 
Feminist economics is a relatively late arrival in professional economics, and 
this had led its proponents to work more closely together to ensure its progress, 
reinforcing its character as a community. Like Hands in his treatment of SSK, 
then, Barker also makes economic methodology reflexive: or something that 
applies to those who develop it as well as to practising economists.
Rob Garnett provides the next contribution to this general discussion in his 
‘Rhetoric and postmodernism in economics’. Another of the important pathways 
away from methodologists’ early Popper–Lakatos focus concerns the role of 
discourse, language, and rhetoric in economic explanation and argument. 
Deirdre McCloskey’s work originated much of this literature, and she made a 
case for rhetoric as the method of economics by directly contesting traditional 
economic methodology – logical positivism, behaviourism, operationalism, 
and the hypothetico-deductive model of explanation – as all part of a modernist 
intellectual culture. In contrast, a postmodernist economic methodology rejects 
foundationalist epistemologies and the search for Truth with a capital-T. Like 
SSK and feminist economic methodology, postmodernism examines how 
scientific communities operate. One significant theme that arises in this regard is 
the extent of pluralism in economics. McCloskey thus not only rejects modernist 
economic methodology, but also illiberal and authoritarian practices on the 
part of economists who foster it. Economics and economic methodology, in 
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her view, ought rather to be modelled on the idea of an open conversation that 
is inclusive rather than exclusive in nature.
The remaining chapters in Part II address particular problems and issues 
in economic methodology that cut across the recent development of the field. 
Jointly they provide a sample of the diversity in themes that have come to reflect 
the rapid expansion of methodological thinking in the last two decades. They 
also point us towards the first and third parts of this Companion, since they 
have also been of interest to philosophers of economics investigating political 
economy as political philosophy and the ontology of economics.
Marcel Boumans, in ‘Models in economics’, addresses the practice of 
economics in the development of modelling. Traditionally the poles of economic 
practice have been thought of as theory and empirical analysis. But economists 
generally reason in terms of models, which lie intermediate between theory 
and empirical analysis. What does economic methodology then have to tell 
us about models in economics? Because models simplify what they represent 
they are necessarily unrealistic. This has led some philosophers of science to 
argue that models are not representations of the world, but rather instruments 
of investigation used to interact with the world (Morgan and Morrison 1999). 
To bring out these issues, Boumans traces the evolution in methodological 
thinking about models and modelling from arguments developed in physics to 
the early thinking about the nature of macro-econometric models on the part of 
Jan Tinbergen for the League of Nations. This history is then linked to current 
debates in philosophy of science and a discussion of model-building practices in 
economics. A surprising result is the variety of different types of elements that 
go into models. Models emerge out of a process analogous to baking: separate 
ingredients are blended and ultimately combined into the final product.
A related topic is the role and nature of mathematics in economics. Peter 
Kesting and Arnis Vilks examine this in their chapter ‘Formalism’. One obstacle 
to understanding formalism in economics is the many ways in which the term 
is used. Kesting and Vilks consequently begin by explaining formalism broadly 
as any approach to theorising that aims at making explicit the logical structure 
of a theory, and then distinguish formal systems from set-theoretic formalism. 
One of the remarkable developments in economics in the last half century is 
general acceptance of set-theoretic formalism. While it is true that most of 
present-day mathematics is derived from set theory, this does not imply that 
this is the only or even necessarily the best basis for connecting formal models 
and reality. The set-theoretic approach owes much of its influence to Bourbaki-
influenced Gerard Debreu’s axiomatic account Theory of Value (1959). But as 
many commentators have noted, the rigor of formal models often comes with a 
relatively loose interpretation of those same models. Kesting and Vilks pursue 
this tension through the recent history of development of formal models in 
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economics, noting how parables, tacit knowledge, and ‘as if’ assumptions play 
a role in the justification of accepted formalist strategies.
The final chapter in this section, Harold Kincaid’s ‘Methodological 
individualism and economics’, turns us to a perennial issue in the methodology 
of economics: the extent to which explanations can and ought to be cast in 
terms of the behavior of individuals. For some, economics is identified with 
individualism. But close examination of the underlying claims making such 
explanations raise a number of difficult philosophical issues. One of the most 
challenging concerns the requirements for reducing statements about social 
phenomena to statements about individuals. In the philosophy of science 
reductionist arguments have been examined in connection with the question 
of whether all science is ultimately physics. Another fundamental issue 
involves what constitutes the ‘best’ explanation in science or in economics. 
These more philosophical questions return us to economic methodology’s 
epistemological concerns, but no less important are the ontological ones the 
topic of individualism raises. When we privilege individualist explanations in 
economics, do we believe that only individuals exist? That society itself does 
not exist? Kincaid argues that many of these questions cannot be solved in an 
a priori manner apart from attention to concrete empirical inquiry. But few 
economists, he notes, are prepared to accept this conclusion.
Social ontology and the ontology of economics
The chapters in the third and final part of this Companion concentrate on 
questions of ontology, that is, questions regarding existence or being and, in 
particular, the nature and structure of the socio-economic realm.1 Some of the 
authors represented here analyse particular aspects of the social world in a 
direct fashion, addressing things such as the relationship between agency and 
structure, the nature of probability, and the nature of money. Others take a more 
indirect route, starting off with particular theories or modelling tools adopted 
by economists, and then asking what these theories or tools presuppose about 
the nature and structure of the social world that they are applied to.
The first three chapters are contributions to critical realism, an important 
stream in the literature on ontological issues in economics that has been 
developing over the last fifteen years or so (see Fleetwood 1999, Lawson 1997, 
2003). One of the hallmarks of critical realism is a view of the social world as 
structured and open,2 and the broad strategy employed in much of this literature 
is to use this view of the world as a benchmark against which to assess the 
extent to which different methods are likely to bear fruit in social research. This 
strategy is both described and put to work in the first chapter in Part III, Tony 
Lawson’s ‘philosophical underlabouring’. Following Locke, Lawson argues that 
the appropriate role of the philosopher of science is not to do science or even 
to attempt to provide general methodological rules for scientists to follow, but 
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rather to engage in what he calls ‘ground clearing’ or removing the ‘rubbish that 
lies in the way to knowledge’ in any particular discipline. Lawson identifies 
three broad ways in which philosophical ground clearing might be useful, in 
what he calls its demystifying, informing and method-facilitating functions.
In Lawson’s view, academic economics is currently in particularly urgent 
need of ground clearing, and that the rubbish to be removed is the dogma that 
the only legitimate mode of economics analysis is mathematical and/or statistical 
modelling. The starting point of his argument is the observation that any specific 
set of research practices and procedures presuppose particular (usually implicit) 
conceptions of the nature and structure of reality. This is where ontology comes 
in, according to Lawson, and why it is so important. He then goes on to argue 
that the mathematical and statistical tools of mainstream economics presuppose 
a world that ‘everywhere comprises (closed) systems of isolated atoms’, in sharp 
contrast to the image of the structured and open social world associated with 
critical realism (and which he subsequently goes on to outline). The implication 
is that, if the social world is indeed as described in critical realism, then there 
is a fundamental mismatch between the tools of mainstream economics and 
the social material that those tools are applied to. But Lawson’s arguments here 
are not only destructive in intent. He also demonstrates different ways in which 
his preferred social ontology may aid social research, by way of providing a 
categorical grammar that may help to sharpen substantive social theoretical 
conceptions and distinctions, by suggesting a distinctive theory of rationality 
that is rather different from the model standardly employed in economics, as 
well as by providing directionality to research in various ways.
The two chapters that follow, by Steve Pratten and Paul Lewis respectively, 
provide good illustrations of different ways in which some of the lessons of 
critical realism may be put to work. Pratten’s chapter is devoted to the New 
Institutional Economics, focusing particularly on the transactions costs approach 
associated with the work of Oliver Williamson (1985, 1989, 1991). Pratten’s 
point of departure is the often-noted ‘gap’ between modern economic theory 
and the socio-economic reality that it purports to be about. Like Lawson, Pratten 
attributes this gap to the profession’s a priori commitment to mathematical 
modelling and the preoccupation with the analysis of fictitious model ‘worlds’ 
that this commitment seems invariably to entail. Indeed, as Pratten sees it, the 
need that many economists feel to conduct research that bears the mathematical 
imprimatur of ‘serious’ economic analysis is fundamentally at odds with moving 
toward a more realistic and relevant economics. The thing that particularly 
interests Pratten about the New Institutional Economics is that this is an area in 
which he sees this tension as being especially apparent. For despite criticising 
mainstream economics for being unrealistic and promoting their project as one 
aimed at greater realisticness and relevance, proponents of the New Institutional 
Economics tend ultimately to retain a strong commitment to formalism. Of course 
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it is possible to maintain that this tension is an illusion on the grounds that that 
the particular formalisms employed so far simply haven’t been the right ones. 
However, and drawing on the ontological insights of critical realism, Pratten 
argues that so long as the assumptions underpinning mathematical methods 
conflict with the constitution of social reality, the mismatch between method 
and material will persist and the various resulting tensions and compromises 
that he identifies will remain.
Paul Lewis tackles the relationship between human agency and social structure, 
a perennial theme in social theory, by way of comparing how this relationship is 
dealt with in contemporary Austrian economics on the one hand and in critical 
realism on the other. In recent years, members of the radical subjectivist wing 
of the Austrian school rejected the atomistic conception of the economic actor 
and have emphasised instead the virtues of portraying people as social beings 
embedded within networks of shared meanings and interpretive traditions (e.g. 
Boettke 1990, 1998; Boettke and Storr 2002; Prychitko 1994a; Vaughn, 1994). 
On this view, as Lewis puts it, traditions and people are mutually constitutive, 
‘with the former being both an ever-present condition for the possibility of socio-
economic activity and also a continually reproduced outcome of the latter’ and 
that the social sciences deal ‘with a pre-interpreted world, where the creation 
and reproduction of meaning-frames is an (ontological) condition of that which 
it seeks to analyse, namely human conduct’. These phrases are reminiscent of 
the so-called transformational model of social activity associated with critical 
realism, according to which agency and structure presuppose each other, and 
the hermeneutic moment. Lewis points out various points of overlap with the 
Austrian position. But there remain significant differences between the two, and 
Lewis emphasises in particular that the Austrian view of the ‘socio-economic 
world as an intersubjective fabric spun from shared meanings that persist or 
change as people negotiate interpretations of events and states of affairs, the 
radical subjectivists run the risk of failing to do justice to the importance of 
the non-discursive (material) aspects of social structure – vested interested and 
power distributions’.
The subject of intersubjectivism leads on neatly to the next two chapters 
by John Davis and Edward Fullbrook who tackle the theme of collective or 
shared intentionality. Davis proposes ‘collective intentionality analysis’ as a 
prospective theoretical framework suited to addressing what he calls ‘complex’ 
economic behaviour. By complex behaviour Davis means behaviour that is not 
amenable to a single explanatory framework such as the mainstream model of 
instrumental economic rationality. Collective intentionality analysis involves 
a distinct approach to rationality in the form of a deontological or principle-
based type rationality that is appropriate to explaining individual interaction 
in social groups. If we suppose individuals are both members of social groups 
and also have occasion to act in relative isolation, then their behaviour needs 
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to be explained in terms of both sorts of rationality principles, giving rise to its 
characterisation as complex.
The rationale for employing collective intentionality analysis as an additional 
account of economic behaviour is that economic agents appear to behave 
differently in organisational, group, and institutional contexts. For example, it is 
often noted that trust relationships based on shared intentions emerge in markets 
characterised by repeated exchange, whereas spot markets with little repeated 
contact tend to be characterised by instrumentally rational behaviour. Here, the 
relevant model involves instrumental and collective rationality operating ‘side-
by-side’ in proportion to the extent that individuals act socially or in a more 
autonomous manner. Further, social groups and organisations differ according 
to how they delegate independent action to individuals. When individuals have 
considerable autonomy and discretion, this may be due to shared intentions 
having created a platform for a circumscribed instrumentally rational behaviour. 
That is, instrumentally rational behaviour is embedded in collectively intentional 
behaviour. An opposite sort of case involves deceit, deception, and fraud. 
Individuals may claim to share intentions while yet acting in a self-serving 
manner. Davis points, then, that the possibility that economic behaviour may 
be complex implies that the policy value space may itself be complex. Moving 
from an exclusive reliance on the instrumental model of economic rationality 
also entails moving from an exclusive reliance on efficiency criteria in normative 
economics towards complex accounts of valuation and recommendation which 
combine efficiency as a value with such values as justice and fairness.
The theme of collective intentionality is continued in the chapter by Edward 
Fullbrook, a prominent proponent of intersubjectivism in economic analysis 
(Fullbrook 1996, 1997). The guiding idea on the intersubjectivist approach is that 
human consciousnesses are constitutionally interdependent, that human subjects 
form and reform themselves, not in isolation, but rather in relation to and under 
the influence of other human subjects and institutions. As Fullbrook points out, 
given how commonsensical this idea is, it is an interesting question why it had 
so little impact on modern philosophy until the last century, and, until recently, 
in mediating in social theory between holistic and radically individualistic 
explanations. Even more significantly, from the viewpoint of this collection, it 
is an interesting question why intersubjectivism continues to remain banished 
from mainstream economics. Fullbrook attempts to answer these questions 
by drawing on the histories of modern philosophy and social theory and their 
relations to economics. The first two-thirds of his chapter explore the Cartesian 
philosophy from which the atomistic conception of the standard model of the 
economic actor derives, and the development of intersubjective philosophy 
and social theory over the last century. The final section considers the case 
of economics. Here Fullbrook argues that, in turning its back on all economic 
phenomena that do not conform to its Cartesian metaphysic, economics not only 
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neglected awkward but central empirical realities but also became wedded to a 
spurious naturalism and the unarticulated but culturally powerful line of racism 
and sexism that this entails.
Philip Faulkner and Jochen Runde devote their chapter to how the standard 
model of the economic actor employed in mainstream microeconomics has 
limited the way in which it approaches information, knowledge and the related 
issues of ignorance and uncertainty. The first half of the chapter is devoted to 
an overview of kind of assumptions typically made in respect of economic 
actors’ knowledge in mainstream economic models. This is achieved by way 
of a detailed exposition of a representative mainstream model, in this case a 
simple one-shot Cournot duopoly game under conditions of both complete and 
incomplete information. It is shown that even where the model is extended to 
the case of incomplete information, a move intended explicitly to highlight 
the effects of imperfections and asymmetries in actors’ knowledge, the 
degree to which the complexities of human knowledge are reflected remains 
severely limited.
The second half of the chapter is devoted to three aspects of human agency that 
are neglected by the mainstream approach: non-probabilistic forms of uncertainty 
and ignorance, the subjectivity of knowledge, and tacit knowledge. Faulkner 
and Runde conclude that the much vaunted information theoretic revolution in 
economics (Stiglitz 2000) represents only a first step towards incorporating the 
effects of factors such as uncertainty, ignorance and subjectivity into economics. 
For instance, by virtue of the commitment to expected utility models of decision-
making, the actors within mainstream microeconomic models inevitably suffer 
only certain forms of uncertainty. There is no scope in these models for actors 
to be affected by ignorance of the full set of possible eventualities that might 
result from their actions (or indeed the options open to them), or to alter their 
behaviour as a result of being unable to state precise probabilities. Categories 
such as surprise and novelty, which are closely associated with uncertainty and 
ignorance, consequently remain outside the scope of mainstream economics.
The theme of uncertainty and ignorance is also taken up in the chapter by 
Chuck McCann, who surveys the major competing interpretations of probability 
and how these have emerged in and coloured different parts of economic theory 
(note that McCann’s focus is on knowledge and belief, and the way in which 
probability theorists have attempted to model them, rather than on probability 
as it is employed in statistics and econometrics). After two brief preliminary 
sections on knowledge and belief and the axiomatic structure of probability, 
McCann introduces the key ontological distinction on which his presentation 
turns, between aleatory conceptions of probability on the one hand and epistemic 
conceptions on the other. On the aleatory conception, probability is taken to be a 
property or feature of the external world (e.g. the frequency of a particular kind 
of realisation within a class of otherwise similar realisations). On the epistemic 
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conception, in contrast, probability is taken to be a feature of how we think about 
the world (e.g. your subjective degree of belief in there being rain tomorrow). 
This distinction is then deployed as organising principle in McCann’s review 
of the major interpretations of probability – classical, frequentist, logical and 
personalist – as well as forming the basis for his subsequent elucidation of the 
distinction between risk and uncertainty. McCann closes by touching briefly on 
some areas in economics in which probability and uncertainty have come to the 
fore: (post)Keynesianism, Rational Expectations and Austrianism.
The final chapter in this collection is Geoff Ingham’s wide-ranging study of 
various views on the nature of money that have been propounded in different 
parts of the discipline. The first part of the chapter deals with the commodity-
exchange theory that has come to dominate mainstream economic theory, and 
the associated conception of money as a neutral veil over what is fundamentally 
a barter economy. Ingham raises various criticisms of this account, chief of 
which is that its emphasis on money as a device to overcome the problem 
of a double coincidence of wants in a pure barter economy, has led to a 
misunderstanding and neglect of money of account. This then leads to a long 
section on heterodox conceptions of money that theorise money as abstract 
value and token credit. The central idea here is that money is constituted, not 
simply by some commodity that becomes accepted as a medium of exchange, 
but by social relations. Among the figures considered are Knapp, Simmel, 
Keynes and Weber, and Ingham shows how the kinds of ideas expressed by 
these authors emerge in recent debates on endogenous money, the theory of the 
‘money circuit’ and modern neochartelism.
Ingham outlines his own position in a closing section on ‘the fundamentals 
of a theory of money’, focusing on three questions: what is money?; how is 
it produced?; and how does it obtain, retain or lose its value? Here Ingham 
sides with the heterodox tradition and its emphasis on money being constituted 
by social relations. Some of the key ontological themes developed here are 
that money is uniquely specified as a measure of abstract value and a means 
of transporting this abstract value, that money cannot be created without 
simultaneous creation of debt, indeed that ‘vast dense networks of overlapping 
and interconnected bilateral credit–debt relations constitute money’, and that the 
abstract idea of money is a prerequisite for the things that represent money (cash, 
cheques, credit cards, magnetic traces on a computer disk, and so on) to work 
as money. In an unusual and refreshing touch, Ingham makes various telling 
points about how these seemingly abstruse and often-dismissed considerations 
can illuminate various recent events on monetary history.
Economics and philosophy
What does the future hold for economics and philosophy? On the one hand, 
as readers will see from the chapters included in this volume, philosophical 
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questions have a surprisingly natural place in economics, since so many issues 
fundamental to the latter find clear and immediate expression when re-presented 
in philosophical terms. No doubt many find this an unexpected development, 
since for many years economics was widely thought to be a relatively separate 
science (Hausman 1992). This view, however, has come into question in light 
of the influence that formal mathematical methods have had on economics over 
the last half century, and so it is not unreasonable to suppose that economics will 
be further changed in the future by growing awareness of and sensitivity to its 
philosophical dimensions. On the other hand, the way forward for economics 
and philosophy is difficult to predict. Whereas the application of mathematics 
to economics generally presupposes a pre-existing set of problems in economics 
which it is typically hoped may be illuminated by mathematics, combining 
philosophy and economics often involves re-considering one’s very starting 
points. Thus not only is there always the potential for fundamental redirection of 
economics in light of new philosophical entry points, but it is not easy to predict 
what sources of philosophical inspiration might be important to economists in 
the future.
However, one possible guide to the future role of philosophy in economics 
might be found in the broad philosophical issues afoot in society today regarding 
such fundamental issues as the relation between society and nature, the effects 
of technological change, the place of moral values in the world, the future of 
humanity, and so on. For many years, academic economics has held little interest 
for most people. But the now wider place of economics in higher level education 
and the greater influence economics seems to have today on people’s everyday 
lives appears to have changed this, such that it is no longer unusual for people 
from across society to have both some understanding of economics and opinions 
about it. Then, on the assumption that peoples’ different views of the world and 
the society they live in depends upon their various philosophical presuppositions, 
however well articulated or ill-formed these may be, it might well be the case 
that these deep-seated views will re-emerge as issues discussed in the domain 
of economics and philosophy. But whatever their origin, philosophical concerns 
now appear to be well-embedded in economics, and not likely to drift off into 
the background again where they once resided.
Notes
1. Recent years have seen a growing interest in ontological issues in economics (see for example 
Mäki 1998, 2000, 2001; Lawson 1997, 2003).
2. By the world being structured we mean that it comprises not only events and states of affairs 
(the actual) and our experiences of them, but also of an ‘underlying’ and often unobservable 
reality of capacities, powers, structures and mechanisms that, once triggered or being otherwise 
in play, give rise to and govern those events and states of affairs. By the world being open we 
mean that the actual could always have been other than it was.
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